光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第 4810 期
主 题：Do golden parachutes matter? Evidence from firms that ultimately filed for bankruptcy
主讲人：诺瓦东南大学 Pankaj Maskara副教授
Dr. Maskara is associate professor of finance at Nova Southeastern University in Florida, USA. His current research is concentrated in corporate finance, financial institutions, and event studies. He has published in renowned finance journals like Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Financial Research, and Quarterly Review of Economic and Finance, among many others. He has also published a book on entrepreneurship.
Currently he is working on several papers focusing on different topics like role of credit unions, effect of institutional infrastructure on FDI, selection bias in event studies, and peer to peer lending. He is also writing a book on innovation, and another on essentials of accounting and finance.
This talk is about the efficacy of golden parachutes as an effective incentive mechanism used to identify and recruit high quality CEOs when facing financial distress. We study bankruptcy outcomes of 275 firms and find that hiring CEOs with golden parachutes (GPs) during financial distress is associated with a lower probability of liquidation. In contrast, firms led by incumbent CEOs with GPs are more likely to be liquidated, as are firms led by new CEOs without GPs. Since GPs are nullified during bankruptcy, the observed relationship cannot be attributed to an explicit incentive effect. Rather, we contend that during financial distress GPs help recruit reputable CEOs who, even without explicit incentives, continue to maximize shareholder value due to implicit reputational and career concerns.